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THE PENNSYLVANIA MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW
LIMITING THE DURATION OF THE LIEN:
REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO OBTAIN A
JUDGMENT WITHIN FIVE YEARS
Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.1 demon-
strates the unfairness which can result from a strict interpretation
of the provision of Pennsylvania's Mechanic's Lien Law 2 which re-
quires recovery of a judgment within five years. This Note will
compare the Pennsylvania mechanic's lien staute of limitations
with those of other states, point out the problems arising in con-
nection with it and suggest possible changes in the statute to solve
these problems.
In Brann, Brann & Stuart Company had filed a mechanic's
lien against Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. for labor and materials
furnished in constructing a warehouse. In June of 1961, a writ of
scire facias was issued. As a result of pretrial motions and other
delays, including an appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the case did not come to trial rapidly enough to obtain a verdict
within the five year limit8 provided for in the mechanic's lien
statute.4 Brann had applied for a special listing to have their case
heard within the allotted time period "which should have been
granted but was denied.' 5 Although this denial forced the re-
covery of a verdict after the time had expired, the trial court de-
cided in favor of Brann. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed on the grounds that, since the right to a mechanic's lien
was statutory, the conditions of the statute must be strictly fol-
lowed. The court stated: "The statute must be followed whether
strict or liberal, harsh or equitable." Justice Roberts dissented,
preferring an interpretation that would bar the lienholder only
if the delays were a consequence of his own actions. He would
not place the lienholder at the "complete peril of delays which are
1. 433 Pa. 574, 253 A.2d 105 (1969).
2. Act of June 5, 1901, No. 240, § 10, [1901] PA. LAws 431, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1701 (d) (1963).
3. Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 433 Pa. 574, 253
A.2d 105 (1969).
4. The Brann case arose under the Act of June 5, 1901, No. 240, § 10,
[1901] PA. LAWS 431 (which required the issuance of a writ of scire facias
and allowed five years from said issuance to obtain a judgment).
5. Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 433 Pa. 574, 576,
253 A.2d 105, 106 (1969).
6. Id. at 577, 253 A.2d at 106.
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either fortuitous or inherent in the judicial system as it presently
operates."7
BACKGROUND
The basic purpose of a mechanic's lien is to give security to a
person who has enhanced the value, through construction or other
improvements, of the land upon which the lien attaches.8 The lien
creates an encumbrance on the title and gives the lienholder pri-
ority over other creditors. The right to such a lien can be found
in Roman law,9 which allowed a vendor to go after property no
longer in his possession, but was nonexistant in the English com-
mon law.10  The states, beginning with Maryland in 1791,
created by statute the mechanic's lien in order to encourage men
to enter the construction field." In 1803, Pennsylvania passed the
nation's second Mechanic's Lien Act,12 providing a "remedy in
the nature of a charge on land to secure a priority or preference
of payment"' for those who improved land. The Act of 1803 had
limited territorial application, 14 gradually expanded by later acts.' 5
A Pennsylvania act in 1836 provided for the expiration of the lien
five years from the filing of the claim unless revived by a writ of
scire facias which would continue the lien for another five years.' 6
Following this, a series of acts were passed amending previous
mechanic's lien acts until, in 1901, an act was passed repealing all
earlier mechanic's lien acts and combining their principles. 7 The
Act of 1901 was constitutionally prohibited from extending the
system of liens beyond that in existence at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of 1874.18 A 1963 amendment"9 to the Act of
1901 limits the time in which to get a judgment to five years from
7. Id. at 578, 253 A.2d at 106-107 (dissenting opinion).
8. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106F (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
9. L. HOUCK, MEcmAIc's LIEN LAW § 4 (1867).
10. Id. at § 5 (once the property had left the possession of the la-
borer, he had no further claim to it).
11. W.M. ROCKEL, MECHANIC'S LIENS § 1 (1909).
12. Act of April 1, 1803, No. 9, § 1, [1901] PA. LAWS 446.
13. S. L. PHILLIPS, MECHANIC'S LIENS § 9 (3d ed. 1893).
14. The Act only applied to Philadelphia, the District of Southwark,
and the Township of Northern Liberties.
15. See 1 E.H. CUSHmAN, THE LAW OF MECHANIc's LIENS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA 5-6 n.13 (1925).
16. Act of June 16, 1836, No. 184, § 24, [18361 PA. LAWS 695.
17. Act of June 5, 1901, No. 240, § 52, [1901] PA. LAWS 431.
18. PA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (1874) (prohibiting the enactment of any
special laws authorizing the extension of liens).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1701(d) (1963), amending Act of June 5,
1901, No. 240, § 10, L1901.
the date of filing of the claim.2 0 The 1901 act had allowed two years
to obtain a writ of scire facias and five years from the issuance of
the writ to obtain a final judgment.21 The 1963 amendment which
shortens the time period puts further pressure on the lienholder to
proceed with haste, while in effect encouraging the property owner
to procrastinate in the hope that the time allowed will expire, his
title will be cleared, and the lienholder will lose his priority over
other creditors.
LIMITATION ON MECHANIC'S LIEN ACTIONS IN OTHER STATES
Connecticut is the only other state which specifically limits
the duration of the lien by limiting the time in which to obtain a
judgment.22 The remaining states only limit the time within which
an action must be commenced.23 Two states, Tennessee and Ne-
braska, exemplify a different approach by providing that the liens
shall continue until the final determination of the suit, if the suit
was initiated within the required time period.
24
Several states have attempted to balance the desirability of
rapidly removing liens upon land with the necessity of giving the
20. Id., which states: "A verdict must be recovered or judgment en-
tered within (5) years from the date of filing of the claim."
21. Act of June 5, 1901, No. 240, § 10, [1901] PA. LAWS 431 (required
that a "verdict must be recovered or judgment entered on the writ of scire
facias within five years after it is issued.")
22. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1969).
23. ALA. CODE tit. 33, § 42 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.080(a)
(1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-998 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-616 (1947); CAL. CrV. PRO. CODE § 1198.1 (West Supp. 1968); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-10 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2711 (1953);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-115 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.221 (1969); GA.
CODE ANN. § 67-2002(3) (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 193-42 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-510 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 9 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-618 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.27
(1950); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 60-1105 (1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
376.090 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3255 (1964); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 63, § 23 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 254, § 11 (1959); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 570.9 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514-12 (1947); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 360 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.170 (Supp. 1969); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 95-510 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-104 (1943); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 108.130, 108.233 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 447.9 (1968);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:44-98 (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-9 (1953);
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 17 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-43 (1966);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-12-11 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.13 (Bald-
win 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 172 (1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 87.055
(1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-28-7 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-262
(1962); S.D. CODE § 39.0715 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1106 (1956);
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5520 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1924 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17
(Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.100 (1961); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 38-2-34 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 289.06 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 29-25 (1957).
24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-103 (1968) ("The lien shall continue until
such suit is satisfied and finally determined."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-
1106 (1956) (". . . and until the final decision of any suit that may be
brought within that time for its enforcement.").
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lienholder a fair chance at utilizing his statutory privilege of pri-
ority. One method used is to provide for prosecution of the suit
"without unnecessary delay"2 5 or "with due diligence."2 6  This
method does not encourage the property owner to delay because
to do so would only serve to prolong the cloud on his title. It also
discourages the lienholder from sitting on his rights and tying up
the land, since by such delay the lienholder could lose his lien.
Procedural delays which frequently accompany court actions would
not penalize either the property owner or lienholder. The result
would be different, however, if the court believed that the lien-
holder or property owner was deliberately taking advantage of
such delays.
The California and Washington statutes27 provide that the suit
must be prosecuted to trial within two years, or the judge may, at
his discretion, dismiss the lien for want of prosecution. These
statutes, by setting a fixed time, establish a standard. By leaving
the dismissal of the lien to the court's discretion, however, such
statutes are sufficiently flexible to encompass delays which may
be unavoidable, inherent in the judicial system, or the fault of the
property owner. The two year limit establishes a guideline for the
lienholder but is not arbitrary.
A popular method for insuring rapid settlement of liens is to
give the property owner a statutory right to demand that the lien-
holder commence suit.2 8 Once the lienholder receives written no-
tice from the property owner to begin suit he has a limited amount
of time, usually from thirty to sixty days, in which to begin his ac-
tion.2 9 This places the burden of promptly removing the lien from
the land on the person most affected by it. The property owner
can have the lien removed at any time by paying the lienholder
what he owes him, or by insisting that he bring suit. If the prop-
erty owner doesn't demand action, he has only himself to blame for
the lien tying up his land.
25. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-616 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 429.170
(Supp. 1969).
26. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 29-25 (1957).
27. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1198.1 (West Supp. 1968); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 60.04.100 (1961) (Both statutes are worded similarly: ".
be not prosecuted to judgment within two years after the commencement
thereof, the court, in its discretion, may dismiss the same for want of
prosecution.").
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.22(2) (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 34
(Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.28 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 52-122 (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-100 (Supp. 1968); OKrA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 177 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1130 (1956).
29. Statutes cited note 28 supra.
The problem of crowded court dockets is serious in many
jurisdictions. Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Brann, noted:
*.. [T]he mechanic's lien could be nullified in almost
every case in Philadelphia County by the simple expedient
of ordering it on the trial list for jury trial (unless the
Court Administrator chooses to grant a special listing,
since the Philadelphia jury trial list as it is now function-
ing requires more than five years after the motion for
trial until a trial can be had.80
Yet, despite the judicial problem of crowded dockets preventing
rapid disposition of cases, only two states have directly attacked
the problem.3 1 Connecticut provides for mechanic's lien actions to
receive special assignments, 32 and Colorado arranges for lien ac-
tions to be placed at the head of the docket.3 3 As the Colorado Su-
preme Court stated in Tiger Placer's Co. v. Fisher:3 4 "The statute
contemplates speedy disposition of cases of this nature." 35  A
"speedy disposition" is impossible in a lien action if there is a long
waiting period before trial. Pennsylvania's only answer to the
problem, however, is the possibility of obtaining a special listing
which will be granted only at the discretion of the court adminis-
trator. Failure to grant a special listing may result in the loss of
the lien as in Brann.
38
COMPARISON OF CONNECTICUT AND PENNSYLVANIA'S LAWS
As previously discussed, Pennsylvania, in 1963, amended the
Mechanic's Lien Act of 1901 shortening the time allowed in which
to receive a judgment. The 1901 Act had permitted a total of
seven years to get a judgment-two years from the filing of the
claim for a writ of scire facias plus five years from the issuance
of the writ to the final settlement of the case. The legislature
abolished the necessity of obtaining the writ of scire facias, allow-
ing the lienholder only five years from the filing of the claim in-
stead of seven to enter a judgment.
3 7
The Connecticut statute,38 the only other one requiring a judg-
ment within a stated amount of time, allows even less time to ob-
tain it. The Connecticut statute requires that an action must be
30. Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 433 Pa. 574,
577, 253 A.2d 105, 106 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-13 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-39 (Supp. 1969).
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1969) ("An action to
foreclose a mechanic's lien shall be privileged in respect to assignment
for trial.").
33. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-13 (1963) ("The court, whenever the
issues in such case are made up, shall advance such cause to the head of
the docket for trial.").
34. 98 Colo. 221, 54 P.2d 891 (1936).
35. Id. at 222, 54 P.2d at 892.
36. 433 Pa. 574, 253 A.2d 105.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1701(d) (1963).
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1969).
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filed within two years after the claim has been filed, and must be
prosecuted to final judgment within another two years.
8 9
Before the Connecticut legislature changed their law in 1965,
the statute read: ". . . [T]he party claiming such lien, within said
period, commences an action to foreclose the same and proceeds
therewith to final judgment." 40  The Connecticut Supreme Court
was called upon to interpret this section in Stanley Svea Coal and
Oil Co. v. Willimatic Savings & Loan Ass'n.41 The court held that
the phrase "within said period", i.e. two years, pertained only to the
commencement of the action and not to the pursuit of judgment
within two years. 42 The court specifically indicated that the "day
of crowded dockets makes such a result imperative. An action such
as this has no privilege of assignment. '48 The court evidently did
not correctly interpret the intention of the legislature since the
law was amended in 1965 to specifically include pursuit of judg-
ment within the two year period.44 The legislature, impressed
by the court's warning concerning crowded court dockets, granted
mechanic's lien actions privilege "in respect to assignment for
trial."' 4" This provision manages to avoid one of the delays in-
herent in the judicial system-crowded court dockets. It does not,
however, remedy the problem of appeals, stays, and delays by the
property owner.
The Pennsylvania statute, although allowing more time to ob-
tain final judgment than the Connecticut statute,46 does not provide
for court docket delays which could easily nullify the extra time by
preventing the case from coming to trial within the required five
years. It is submitted that the Connecticut statute, although con-
taining a shorter statute of limitations than Pennsylvania, is su-
perior to Pennsylvania's in its handling of the crowded court prob-
lem. As long as Pennsylvania persists in its demand for judgment
within five years, a special listing should be mandatory, not dis-
cretionary.
STRICT STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
A mechanic's lien, as a statutory creation and not an outgrowth
39. Id.
40. Co~N. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (1958).
41. 23 Conn. Supp. 329, 183 A.2d 285 (1962).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 332, 183 A.2d at 287.
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1969).
45. Id.
46. Pennsylvania gives a possible total time of five years, Connecticut
only four. Connecticut further divides the time into two years to com-
mence the action and two years to receive judgment.
of the English common law, has always been strictly interpreted.47
Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly ruled that if the statutory pro-
vision were not strictly followed the lien would be lost.48 Thus,
both the right itself and the method of enforcing that right are de-
pendent upon the statutes whose provisions must be strictly fol-
lowed.49  This principle was defined in Murray v. Zemon50 in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
We must always bear in mind that this is not a common
law action, but rather a claim to assert a peculiar type of
lien against real estate under the provisions of a statute,
strict compliance with which has always been demanded.
[Mechanic's] liens are purely creatures of statutes; they
did not exist at common law. Consequently, they are
available only on such terms as the Legislature saw fit to
provide.51
The courts have therefore limited their power and, even when an
unjust or unreasonable result occurs, have remained chained to the
strict interpretation doctrine for statutory rights. In Hall v.
Steininger,52 the court sustained the defendant's demurrer, bluntly
admitting that the plaintiff, by not following the mandatory pro-
cedure, lost his lien "even though there may be moral obliga-
tions."5 3  In Sterling Bronze Co. v. Syria Improvement Ass'n, 4
a verdict was obtained from the trial court after the five year limit.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not allow the judgment to
stand, holding:
The claimant under a lien of this character has no greater
right than the Legislature gave him ... [T]his preference
being of statutory origin must stand or fall upon compli-
ance or noncompliance with the conditions and require-
ments imposed by the act under which the lien is au-
thorized.55
Niessen v. Playwicki Park Corp.56 was a case in which the
court refused to retroactively apply the 1963 act; the lien having
been filed while the 1901 act was still in effect. If the 1963 act
had been applied, the plaintiff would not have had time to obtain
his judgment. The court's decision in Niessen would not have
aided Brann, however, since in Brann the time had expired under
either act. The court's refusal to apply the shortened time period of
47. 23 P.L.E., Mechanic's Liens § 71 (1959).
48. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Reese, 419 Pa. 489, 215 A.2d 257 (1965);
Murray v. Zemon, 402 Pa. 354, 167 A.2d 253 (1960); Sterling Bronze Co. v.
Syria Improvement Ass'n., 226 Pa. 475, 75 A. 668 (1910); Hall v. Stein-
inger, 44 West 87 (C.P. Pa. 1950).
49. See McCarthy v. Reese, 419 Pa. 489, 215 A.2d 257 (1965).
50. 402 Pa. 354, 167 A.2d 253 (1960).
51. Id. at 358, 167 A.2d at 255.
52. 44 West 87 (C.P. Pa. 1950).
53. Id. at 89.
54. 226 Pa. 475, 75 A. 668 (1910).
55. Id. at 476-77, 75 A. at 669.
56. 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 197 (Bucks County 1965).
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the 1963 act was partially based on the property owner's own ac-
tions. The court found that it would be unjust to reward the prop-
erty owner for his delaying tactics by allowing him to take ad-
vantage of the 1963 change in time. The Niessen case unfortunately
did not require the court to directly face the issue of expired time
due to the property owner's actions versus the innocent lienholder.
Nor did it do away with the doctrine of strict statutory compliance.
It did show, however, that the court would not permit a property
owner to take advantage of a situation he was primarily responsible
for at the expense of a lienholder.
There are two cases in Pennsylvania which do not appear to
require strict statutory interpretation. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Rosenheck v. Stape57 held that the 1901 act, section 10,
constituted only a "legislative declaration of what will constitute
due prosecution."5 8 This interpretation is similar to that given to
the mechanic's lien statutes of California and Wasington.5 9 A
lower court decision, A & C Construction Co. v. Maloof,60 held that
the mere passage of time would not cause the lienholder to toally
lose his lien, but that stays of proceedings would act to toll the run-
ning of the statute. In other words, the lien could run over the
five year limit that commences with the date of the filing of the
claim.6 1
Thus, these courts took other factors into consideration rather
than adhering to strict statutory interpretation. A strict inter-
pretation, on the other hand, allows no excuses; it is totally in-
flexible. The lien is lost after the five year time period expires.
The majority in Brann required strict statutory construction: "It
must be assumed that the legislature took delays, regardless of
source, into account when it established the five year limitation.
The statute must be followed whether strict or liberal, harsh or
equitable. '62  The Pennsylvania legislature, having recently
amended the statute in 1963, could be presumed to be aware of the
problems. In 1901, the crowded court docket problem was not as
acute as it is today. Yet, in 1963, when crowded court dockets were
57. 332 Pa. 287, 197 A. 531 (1938).
58. Id. at 288, 197 A. at 534 (the issue being tried, however, was the
constitutionality of the law; Rosenheck, having obtained his judgment
within the five year limit).
59. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
60. 17 Monroe 223 (C.P. Pa. 1955).
61. The case was settled before appeal was brought. Therefore the
issue was not brought before the Pennsylvania superior or supreme
court.
62. Brann & Stuart Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 433 Pa. 574,
253 A.2d 105 (1969).
a serious problem, the legislature shortened the time period from
seven to five years while failing to provide a method for getting
through the judicial proceedings, or even to trial, in time. Special
listings are at the mercy of a court administrator who has discre-
tionary power to grant the listing or not. A more practical inter-
pretation than Brann's strict statutory construction would be that
of Rosenheck which held that the statutory time provision was
suggestive-not mandatory. This interpretation is supported by a
leading authority on Pennsylvania trial procedure:
In all cases where an act is commanded to be performed
within a fixed time and involves the exercise of a purely
judicial function or where it is impossible of judicial per-
formance within the time fixed by the legislature, such
provision will always be held directory and not manda-
tory.
63
By holding that such provision is directory only, the court could
insist that the lienholder prosecute his suit diligently, enabling
early clearance of title and fulfilling the legislative intent. At the
same time the lienholder would not be penalized for something
which was the fault of the judicial system or his opponent. Thus,
the Pennsylvania judicial system could accomplish the same equit-
able result which California and Washington provided for by legis-
lative action."
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's mechanic's lien law is not attuned to the rest
of the nation. The purpose of the short time period apparently is
to prevent unjustifiable "serious clogs" on titles.6 5 This frees the
land from having a lien hanging over it for an unnecessarily long
period of time. Yet, by making the time period five years without
allowing any discretion for excuses, Pennsylvania, in effect, en-
courages the property owner to delay while at the same time seek-
ing to prevent the lienholder from doing so. It is more practical
to require the diligent pursuit of justice without unnecessary de-
lay. This would serve to prevent the lienholder from sitting on
his rights or using delaying tactics and, at the same time, would not
reward the property owner for his own delays. The property
owner's cooperation would be fostered since it would be in the
property owner's best interest to remove the lien and the conse-
quent cloud on his title as rapidly as possible. It would also elimi-
nate any unfairness which may result from delays that are not
the fault of either party, but are caused by judicial tardiness. If
the legislature wishes to further protect the property owner, it
could amend the act giving the property owner the right to force
the lienholder to commence suit. The problem of crowded court
63. B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE § 254 (1959).
64. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
65. See P. BAYSE, CLEARINc LAND TiTLEs § 140 (1953).
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dockets could be easily avoided by giving lien actions a mandatory
special listing. A mechanic's lien attaching to the land and im-
provements on the land creates an encumbrance on the title. This
encumbrance should be adjusted as rapidly as possible and should
take precedence over other less important suits on the docket.
Finally, the court should be allowed more discretion to weigh the
equities involved, and to penalize the delaying party.
JANE F. WooDsmE
